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NOTES

up a title in himself inconsistent with the title of the mortgagee. 7
Opposed to that result, in a very recent case8 where the defendant
claimed an interest prior to the making of the mortgage, under an
oral contract with the mortgagor and possession taken pursuant
thereto, the court held no freehold was involved, citing Becker v.
Fink9 and another case.10 Becker v. Fink involved only a question
of priority of liens, but Williams v. Spitzer, the other case cited, involved a defense by a third person who claimed title from the
mortgagor under a deed that antedated the mortgage, yet under circumstances, where at the time of the conveyance to him his grantor
held nothing but a contract right under a contract with the mortgagee. Ir holding, as it does, that no freehold was there involved,
that case relies upon Van Meter v. Thomas," which involved a
claim of lien on the decree obtained by the mortgagees, because of
a judgment obtained against one mortgagee, and this can hardly
be said to sustain the decision which relies upon it for support.
In that quandary appears the case which is the subject of this
note.2 That case was one where the defendants claimed title by
deed from the mortgagor which they insisted was delivered prior
to the making of the mortgage. In effect, that case is very much
like Kerfoot v. Cronin supra. The majority opinion held a freehold was involved, thus arriving at the same result but without
reference to the Kerfoot case, citing in support of that result, instead, three cases' 3 none of which appear to sustain the position
taken. A dissenting opinion relies upon Farmers State Bank v.
Fast."
Inasmuch as it is really only a question of practice, it is hoped
that the law upon that aspect of this question is now settled in
favor of the rule of Kerfoot v. Cronin, for the majority opinion
having reached that result apparently unaware of the existence of
that case, the opinion must necesarily be strengthened by its addition.
ELmER M. LEESMAN.
OF STATE COURTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION
OVER CAUSES ARISING UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LABILITY

In 1910, sec. 6' of the Federal
Ac.-[United States]
Employers Liability Act was amended by adding the following:
7. Kerfoot v. Cronin (1882) 105 II. 609. discussed in 8 ILLINois LAW
REVIEw 176. 178.
8. Farmers State Bank v. Fast (1928) 329 Ill. 601.
9. Note 3 supra.
10. William v. Spitzer (1903) 203 Ill. 505.
11. (1894) 153 IIl. 65.
12. Sullivan v. Abbott (1929) 335 Ill. 129.
13. Ga.qe v. Pease (1883) 107 Ill. 598; discussed in 8 Iu=ois LAw
REmw 176. 179; Franklin v. Loan and Investment Co. (1894) 152 Ill. 345;
Van Meter v. Thomas., see note 11 supra.
14. See note 8 supra.
1. "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced
within two years from the day the cause of action accrued."
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"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of the action arose, or in
which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing
such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
this chapter shall bd concurrent with that of the courts of the several
states, and no case arising under this chapter and brought in any state
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the
United States. ' 2
Two recent cases, Hoffman v. State of Missouri," and Michigan
Central Railway Company v. Mix4 involving jurisdiction over cases
brought in state courts, on causes of action arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act have completely ignored sec. 6, as
amended. The question in each case was whether the principle
announced in Davis v. Farmers Co-operativeEquity Company5 could
be applied to defeat the jurisdiction of the state courts. In the
Davis case -it was held that a statute authorizing service upon an
agent soliciting business for an interstate carrier in Minnesota, construed by the courts of Minnesota as compelling every foreign interstate carrier to submit to suit as a condition precedent to the right
of maintaining a soliciting agent within the state, was invalid under
the commerce clause. In that case the statute compelled the submission to jurisdiction in an action which arose outside of that state
and where neither of the parties were residents of that state; where
the defendant did not operate or maintain any portion of its transportation system within the state of Minnesota, and where the trial
of a case so far from the residence of the witnesses would adversely
affect the interstate business of the carrier.6 The Employers Liability Act was not involved in the Davis case.
In the Hoffman case there was a suit in a state court in Missouri
against a Missouri corporation, by a citizen of Kansas upon a cause
of action arising in Kansas under the Employers Liability Act. It
was held by the Supreme Court that the Davis case did not apply because the railroad company was sued in the state of its incorporation,
and was engaged in both intrastate and interstate business in the state.
In the Mix case, X, an employee of the Michigan Central Railroad
Company, was killed in Michigan. His widow moved to Missouri,
was there appointed administratrix of his estate, and brought suit
in a state court under the Employer's Liability Act. The railroad
company was a Michigan corporation and had -only a soliciting
agency in Missouri. It was held that the principle of the Davis
case defeated the jurisdiction of the state court; that jurisdiction
2. 45 U. S. C. A. sec. 56; Act, Apr. 5, 1910, c. 143; 36 Stat 291, sec. 1.
3. (1927) 274 U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485, 71 L. Ed. 905.
.4. (1929) 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207, 73 L. Ed.
5. (1923) 262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996.
6. The Davis case was followed, with questionable propriety, in Iron
Citv Produce Co. v. American Rv. Express Co. (1926) 22 Ohio App. 165,
153 N. E. 316. It was held in Griffln v. Seaboard Airline (1928) 28 Fed. (2d)

'998, that it did not apply if the plaintiff was" a resident of the state. In none
of these cases was the Employer's Liability Act involved.
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is determined by the residence of the parties at the time the cause of
action accrued rather than at the time the suit is commenced.7
Nothing is said in either case as to sec. 6 of the Employer's
Liability Act. It is difficult to believe that it was overlooked.8 The
conclusion must be that the court considered sec. 6 to be so clearly
inapplicable as to require no comment. That it is not quite so
simple as that is evidenced by at least one decision to the effect
that sec. 6 made inapplicable to a suit under the act the doctrine
of the Davis case.9
The provision of sec. 6 in regard to suits in the federal courts
is probably only a venue statute. The federal courts clearly had
jurisdiction under existing legislation, for the cause arose under
"the Constitution or laws of the United States.' 10 Jurisdiction was
here originally limited to claims in excess of three thousand dollars."'
But this limitation was removed in 1911, when sec. 24 of the Judicial
Code was amended, giving the district courts jurisdiction "of all2
suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce.'1
If it be construed to regulate venue or jurisdiction still sec. 6
can be sustained as valid Federal legislation, either under the power
of Congress over the federal courts, or under its power over interstate commerce. 1 3 There would seem to be no doubt but that if in
7. The principal case was a suit brought by the railroad company for
a writ of prohibition against the trial court's action in assuming jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Brandeis makes the surprising assumption that the widow did
change, or might have, changed her residence for the express purpose of
bringing the suit in Missouri, rather than in Michigan. If this had been
the fact, and were it pertinent, clearly the burden was on the railroad company to plead and prove it.
8. The Mix case was decided Feb. 18, 1929. The case of Douglas v.
N. Y.. N. H. & H. R. Co., 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355, was first argued January
16, 1929. and specifically involved the question of the proper construction
of sec. 6. It was held in that case that sec. 6 did not impose a duty upon
a state court to accept jurisdiction of suits arising under the act. Although
the court cites Second Einplovers Liabilitv cases (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, as sustaining this result, the language of that
case is to the contrary. The court there said, "The suggestion that the act
of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the state, and therefore
that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible." (P. 57.)
9. Murnan v. Wabash R.. Co. (1927) 220 App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y.
S. 332.

10. U. S. Jud. Code, sec. 24 (1); U. S. C. A., sec. 41, title 28. Accord,

Cound v. Atchison. T. & S. F. Rv. Co. (1909) 173 Fed. 527 (1909); Clark
v. So. Pac. Co. (1909) 175 Fed. 122.
11. See authorities cited supra note 10.
12. 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, title; U. S. Jud. Code, sec. 24 (8).
13. In Connell. v. Central Ry. Co. of N. J. (1916) 238 Fed. 932, it was
given effect without question. In St. Louis. B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor (1924)
266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247, it was said that Congress
"might" have regulated the venue and jurisdiction of causes of action under
the Carmack Amendment. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. 71 L. Ed. 684, it was
held that Congress could regulate the venue of actions under the 'Sherman
Act. And in Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Lesli (1915) 238 U. S. 599, 35 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 844, 59 L. Ed. 1478, and Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett (1917) 244
U. S. 571, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703, 61 L. Ed. 1321, the provision of sec. 6
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the Mix case the action had been brought in the federal court in
Missouri it could have been maintained."4 The objection that there
was an interference with interstate commerce is obviously met by
the answer that Congress expressly has given legislative sanction
to it.
Does not the same answer apply to an action in the state courts,
in a state where the defendant is doing business? Sec. 6 gives the
federal courts and the state courts concurrent, i. e., equal, jurisdiction. If the first portion of tho section be construed to be a regulation of the venue of actions in the federal courts and therefore
inapplicable to the jurisdiction of state courts, still by other valid
federal legislation all the federal district courts are given jurisdiction. 5 The competent courts of all states therefore have jurisdiction, because all federal district courts have jurisdiction.
If the first portion of the section be construed to be a regutlation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, then jurisdiction
of the state courts is limited to those states where the parties
are residents, or where the action accrued, or the carrier is doing
business.
In either event it would seem that the Supreme Court could
not re-regulate the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts, but
would be forced to accept the regulation of Congress to the effect
that any competent federal or state court in a state where the carrier was doing business has jurisdiction.
BERNAD C. GAVIT.
REcEIVERsHIPS-PRocEss-FoREIGN
CoRuo1zTxoNs.-[New
York] In an action begun in New York by a Vermont citizen
against a Vermont corporation for negligence occurring in Vermont
and causing death there the summons was served upon a director
residing in New York. The defendant had been placed in the hands
of receivers in Vermont and the receivership had been extended to
New York under U. S. Jud. Code sec. 56, after the cause of action
arose but before the service of process. The defendant having
moved to set aside the service, held, the motion should be granted.
Gaboury v. Central Vermont Ry. Co.'
The efficiency of post-receivership service of process in suits
arising out of pre-receivership business has but rarely come before
the courts. In the instant case, the court (Cardozo, C. J.) rested
its decision on two grounds: (1) that a foreign corporation which
has been placed in receivership is in the same position as if it had
against removal of causes to the federal courts, if begun in the state courts,
was given unquestioned effect.
14. There can be no question but what the railroad company was "doing business" in Missouri within the meaning of sec. 6. It may have been
doing interstate business exclusively, but the act makes no distinction between
interstate and intrastate business. It requires merely that the defendant be
"doing business" in the district.
15. See supra, notes 10 and 12.
1. (1929) 250 N. Y. 233, 165 N. E. 275.

